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+

In the annals of job health and safety, 1974 was a signal year. It produced an epidemic of occupational liver cancer associated with vinyl chloride/ disclosure of a plan to soft-pedal federal regulation of industrial
hazards in return for contributions to the 1972 Nixon reelection campaign/1
and the publication of a brace of exposes decrying the human toll taken
by workplace perils. These events furnish hard evidence that the bright
hopes raised by passage of the landmark Occupational Safety and H ealth
Act of 19708 remain far from fulfillment.
In the search for reasons for this ostensible failure, two books present
appropriate starting points. Paul Brodeur's Expendable Americans• and
Rachel Scott's Muscle and Blood 5 illumine patterns of indifference and
• B.A. I 955, LL.B. I958, LL.M. I964, Harvard University. Professor of Law, Georgetown University.
1. On January 22, I974, the B.F. Goodrich Company announced that several employees at its
plastics factory in Louisville, Kentucky, had died from angiosarcoma, a rare and fatal form of liver
cancer. The workers had been exposed to vinyl chloride, a colorless gas used in the production of the
solid plastic, polyvinyl chloride. S~e OSHA, Preamble to Emergency Temporary Standard for Expomrt: to Vinyl Chloride, 39 Fed. Reg. I2342 (I974). In the entire United States, the death toll
from angiosarcoma had been averaging about 2I per year. See Saar, Vinyl Chloride and Cancer,
Washington Post, May 5, I974, § C, at 2, col. I . At the Goodrich plant there were 4 fatalities in 5
years. By late I974• a worldwide total of 26 angiosarcoma cases among vinyl-chloride workers had
been uncovered. See Kramer, Vinyl-Chloride Risks Wert: Known by Many Before First Death.r, Wall
St. J., Oct. 2, I974, at 1, col. I. In addition, employees producing finished goods from polyvinyl chloride, such as floor tile and fabrics, have suffered both liver cancer and serious but noncancerous liver
disease. See Kramer, Death of 2 Polyvinyl Chloride Workers From Rare Type of Cancer is Verified,
Wall St. J., June I4, I974, at 8, col. I; Kramer, Sdentists Hear Reports That Vinyl Chlorid~ May Be
More Dangerous Than Realized, Wall St. J., May I3, I974, at 8, col. 3·
2. St:~ Randall, Worker Safety and Politics, Washington Star-News, July I5, I974, §A, at I, col. I.
3· 29 u.s.c. §§ 65I-78 (I970).
4· Hereinafter cited asP. BRODEUR.
5· Hereinafter cited as R. Scorr.
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reckless disregard toward job health and safety by both government and
industry. The authors focus primarily upon the years following enactment
of the 1970 law. Fired by indignation in the muckraking tradition, the
efforts of Brodeur and Scott seek to attract attention to a social issue that,
despite its awful dimensions, has never enjoyed a prominent place on the
public agenda. 6 The books complement each other nicely, with Brodeur's
etching in great detail the development and enforcement of federal standards regulating worker exposure to asbestos dust and Scott's weaving a
patchwork of vignettes that stress the human side of occupational disability. Yet both books are flawed, not only as exercises in popular journalism
but also in their contribution toward understanding the obstacles to significant reductions in job accidents and diseases. They shrink from some of
the really difficult, complex problems and fail to analyze or even suggest
alternative strategies for achieving acceptably safe and healthful working
conditions.
This Review will attempt a critical assessment of Expendable America1u
and Muscle and Blood, elaborating on one of the critical dilemmas that the
books only lightly touch upon and commenting briefly on some sources
for possible improvement in the workplace environment. No definitive
solutions will be offered; indeed, none may exist. However, this Review
will suggest some action that may be taken to pierce the veil of neglect that
has long shrouded the protection of worker health and safety.

I. AssEssMENT OF THE ExPos:Es
Paul Brodeur's repore limns in somewhat personalized terms the author's study of the responses of industry, government, medicine, and labor
to the health hazards of asbestos dust-a subject Brodeur previously pursued at some length in both artide8 and book form.9 Although the author
digresses to explore other aspects of occupational health regulation, the
major portion of the book chronicles events following the discovery that
workers at a Texas asbestos-insulation factory were being exposed to harmful quantities of asbestos dust and describes the promulgation of a federal
standard for acceptable asbestos dust levels 1under the Occupational Safety
and Health Act.
Although the deleterious effects of asbesltos dust upon the human lung
6. A 6-month survey by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1971 uncovered an estimated 3.1 million job injuries and illnesses and nearly 4,300 work-related deaths in the nonfarm sector during the
survey period. See 1973 PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 5· The 1972
Report stated that "there may be as many as 1oo,ooo deatths per year from occupationally caused
diseases." 1972 PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFE~ry AND HEALTH III.
7· Brodeur's account first appeared as a 5-part series i!n the New York,er. See Brodeur, Annals
of Industry-Casualties of the WorkPlace, NEw YoRKER, Oct. 29, 1973, at 44; id., Nov. 5, 1973, at
92; id., Nov. 12, 1973, at 131; id., Nov. 19, 1973, at 87; id., Nov. 26, 1973, at 126.
8. Brodeur, The Magic Mineral, NEw YoRKER, Oct. 12, 1968, at 117.
9· P. BRODEUR, AsBESTOS AND ENZYMES (1972).
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have long been recognized, the actual scope of the health hazard did not
become evident until Dr. Irving Selikoff of the Mount Sinai Environmental Sciences Laboratory began to study asbestos workers in 1962. Examining live workers over a period of time and researching the medical records
of deceased workers, Dr. Selikoff found not only high levels of lung scarring, or asbestosis, but also an alarming incidence of lung cancer and mesothelioma (a rare cancer of the pleural linings of the lung and chest).
Brodeur recounts the reactions of company officials of an asbestos-insulation plant in Tyler, Texas, and of the then federal Division of Occupational Health10 to the grim discoveries being made and publicized by Dr.
Selikoff and his associates and to reports that the levels of asbestos dust in the
Tyler factory exceeded what were then deemed safe limits. The company
took air samplings and conducted studies that were both bungled by incredible omissions and invested with a minimal sense of urgency. The federal
agency directed its energies solely to data collection and took no interest
in devising ways to protect the workers. In 1¢9, pursuant to their responsibilities under the Walsh-Healey Act,11 Department of Labor inspectors
visited the plant, took air samples without proper measuring equipment,
recommended the issuance of respirators to employees and improvements
in ventilation, but failed to follow up to determine compliance. In 1971,
two doctors newly appointed to the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH)-formerly the Division of Occupational
Health-discovered the data their agency had been gathering and became
alarmed over its implications. Frustrated in their attempts to interest the
Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) in taking enforcement action under the 1970 Act, they notified
union officials, who in turn demanded a N IOSH12 inspection of the Tyler
factory and a medical examination of the workers. The NIOSH survey
concluded that a grave health crisis existed at the plant. OSHA inspectors
then visited the facility. Although their .findings did not contradict those
of N IOSH, they proposed fines of only $210 for nonserious violations of
the Act. 13 Subsequent pressure by the union and publicitv over working
conditions at the plant helped to provoke a decision by the company in
early 1972 to close down the Tyler installation.
ro. The agency was later to become the Bureau of Occupational Safety and Health and then the
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health. For a description of this agency and a critique
of its past performance, see J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, BITTER WAGES 88- 94, 197--99 (1973).
II. Act of June 30, 1936, ch. 881, 49 Stat. 2036. The Act covered work being performed under
certain federal contracts and required that working conditions be safe and healthful. The only sanction the Act imposed was denial of future federal contracts to violators. On the Labor Department's
administration and enforcement of the Act, see J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 10, at 94-104. The
Walsh-Healey Act has been superseded by the Occupational Safety and Health Act. See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 653(a), (b)(2) (1970).
12. For a discussion of the different functions performed by OSHA and NIOSH see text accompanying notes 32-34 infra.
'
I 3· OSHA requires the issuance of a citation for non serious violations "in situations where an
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As the controversy over the situation in Tyler intensified, a petition
from the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO forced OSHA
to initiate rulemaking proceedings for the development of a new exposure
standard for asbestos dust. Brodeur describes in detail several sessions of
the public hearing during which union officials and scientists argued for
a standard of two fibers per cubic centimeter of air, to be reduced to zero
at a later date, while industry urged that the level be set at five fibers. Brodeur effectively demonstrates a link between the asbestos industry and
both a Canadian scientist who testified as a purportedly independent witness in favor of the 5-fiber standard, and Arthur D. Little, Inc., a private
consulting firm engaged by OSHA to study the economic impact of the
various proposed standards. Indeed, the author's analysis of what he terms
the "medical-industrial complex"14-the subtle (and not so subtle) interrelationships among industry, the medical and scientific communities, and
government-is one of the strengths of the book.16
Expendable Americans is devastating as a case study of the Tyler affair,
instructive as far as it delves into the setting of the asbestos standard, and
incomplete as an overall picture of job health regulation. The timing of
events unfortunately prevented Brodeur from making use of the revelation
that the former Assistant Secretary of Labor in charge of OSHA, in response to a White House request that federal agencies and departments
consider how they might help reelect Richard Nixon in 1972, had formulated a scheme whereby OSHA would refrain from setting health standards
objectionable to industry, in return for corporate campaign contributions.16
In addition, the dramatic discovery that occupational exposure to vinyl
chloride gas can cause a rare form of liver cancer17 occurred too late for
inclusion except in the Epilogue.
Brodeur's approach is chronological and virtually that of a diarist; he
records the progress of his own investigations and discoveries and does
not hesitate to meander into other related occupational health matters. Unfortunately, he seldom attempts to put his observations in perspective.18
As a result, his style, when combined with occasional lapses into excessive
detail, risks losing readers unfamiliar with the subject. Moreover, although
incident or occupational illness resulting from violation of a standard would probably not cause death
or serious physical harm but which have a direct or immediate relationship to the safety or health of
employees." OSHA, CoMPLIANCE OPERATIONS MANUAL VIII-6 (1972).
14. P. BRODEUR at 154·
1 5· It is instructive to compare this analysis with a recent opposing argument that warns of the
growing power of the "regulatory-medical complex," which it defines as "a loose but not uncoordinated network of regulatory agencies, government research institutes, academic medical teams,
labor unions, and other groups united by a common commitment to eradicate environmental causes
of disease." Weaver, On the Horm of the Vinyl Chloride Dilemma, FoRTUNE, Oct. I974, at ISO,
202-0 4.

16. See Randall, supra note 2.
I7. See note I supra.
I 8. The book provides occasional compensations, such as the dramatic effect of the culmination
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the book stores a wealth of information, the publisher's failure to provide
an index makes access to this valuable material difficult.
While Expendable Americans will especially delight the cognoscenti,
Muscle and Blood seeks to aim shock waves at a more general readership.
Rachel Scott marshals a series of case studies in an attempt to convey a
sense of the "massive, hidden agony of industrial slaughter in America."19
Having visited the sites of a number of workplace catastrophes, she pre~
sents a victim'Hye view of the physical consequences of job accidents and
illnesses and of the financial constraints imposed by the inadequacies of
worker's compensation. On the other hand, curtains of corporate secrecy
frustrated her efforts to obtain industry's side of the story. She corroborates
Brodeur's argument for the existence of a "medical~industrial complex"
through her incisive discussion of the Industrial H ealth Foundation, an
organization funded by industry to conduct "independent" scientific re~
search that invariably serves the purposes of its sponsors. 20
Nevertheless, when she turns from specific facts to broader issues, Scott's
argumentation becomes diffuse and loses impact. She fails to capitalize on
the outrage generated by her vignettes by directing it toward positive s~
lutions. Thus she scores state regulation of occupational safety and health
in a manner more appropriate to the period before the 1970 Act took effect,
without discussing the effect the new law is having and can have upon the
states.21 Moreover, her generalized comments on OSHA and NIOSH are
not conducive to an understanding of what can be accomplished within
the present legal and administrative framework. Too often her generalized,
polemical prose masks a failure to offer concrete proposals, as exemplified
by her concluding point that"[ o ]nly the American people themselves have
the power to bring about the changes that can stop this industrial rna~
sacre."22

II.

CoNTROVERSY OVER CosT

A shortcoming common to both the Brodeur and Scott books is their
failure to present comprehensive looks at the issues involved in assessing
cost of compliance. In his account of OSHA's asbestos rulemaking, Br~
of the author's persistent, unsuccessful attempts to obtain information from the medical director of
the parent corporation owning the Tyler factory. As recounted at the end of the book, Brodeur finally
met the director face-to-face and asked to interview him concerning the health problems of the men
at the T yler plant. The doctor refused, stating: "It's a question of the patient's rights." P. BRODEUR
at 245· The "patient" to whom the doctor was referring was his corporate employer.
19. Dust jacket toR. ScoTT.
20. See also J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN", mpra note 10, at I 53-54.
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1970). See also J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 10, at 210-21 ; Brown,
Stau Plans under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 38 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 745
(1974); Seymour, Forging a Partnership with the States, MoNTtn.Y LABOR REv., Aug. 1973, at 28;
Sheehan, OSHA and State fob Safety Plant, MoNTHLY LABOR REv., Apr. 1974, at 44; Comment, An
Alternative to Federal Preemption: The Washington Plan, 9 GoNZAGA L. REv. 615 (1974).
22. R. ScoTT at 296.
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deur discusses the agency's consideration of costs in formulating its final
regulation. He accepts the contention of union officials who argued that
cost of compliance should be totally irrelevant to the development of health
standards, and he attacks both the merits and the conflict-of-interest aspect
of the Arthur D. Little study commissioned by OSHA to analyze the economic impact of various asbestos-dust exposure limits. The cost issue is,
however, far more complicated than Brodeur implies and therefore deserves more detailed analysis.
The legal argument for inclusion of a cost factor in promulgating industry health regulations hinges on vague phraseology in the 1970 Act.
When the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare considered the
bill, Senator Jacob Javits secured the adoption of an amendmene3 that,
as it emerged in the final version of the law, required OSHA to weigh the
"feasibility" of health standards ~ and to promulgate standards that would
protect the health of employees "to the extent feasible." ~ The legislative history sheds little light on what Congress actually intended by these terms. 26
Other language in the Act is equally unhelpful. The purpose of the
1970 Act is to "assure so far as possible every working man and woman in
the Nation safe and healthful working conditions." 27 The term "occupational safety and health standard" is defined as a standard incorporating
requirements "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment." 28 Since absolute safety and health would compel the
cessation of all work activity, 29 the limitations imposed on the scope of
federal regulation by the phrases "so far as possible" and "reasonably necessary" are vague indeed. The lack of congressional guidance for resolving
issues of economic feasibility is particularly deplorable in light of the precision of other federal safety statutes on this point.80
2

2

23. SeeS. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1970).
24. 29 u.s.c. § 655(b)(5) (1970).
25. Id. (emphasis added). No similar mandate attached to the imposition of safety standards.
26. The House version contained no similar qualification. The Conference Committee adopted
the Senate language. See H.R. REP. No. 1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1970).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
28. ld. § 652(8).
29. See G. CALABREsJ, THE CosTS OF AcciDENTS 17-18 (1970).
30. For example, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1391 (r) (1970),
the Consumer Product Safety Act, I 5 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (Supp. III, 1973), and the National Mobile
Home Construction and Safety Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 603(8), 88 Stat. 700 (Aug. 22,
1974), seek to eliminate "unreasonable" risks of harm. The same acts also expressly mandate consideration of costs. See 15 U.S.C. § 2058(c)(1)(C) (Supp. III, 1973) (Consumer Product Safety Act);
Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 6o4(f)(4), 88 Stat. 701 (Aug. 22, 1974) (Mobile Home Act). See also 15
U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1970), which requires that federal motor vehicle safety standards be "practicable."
On the basis of strong legislative history, the term has been interpreted to encompass consideration of
economjc factors. See H & H Tire Co. v. United States Department of Transp., 471 F.2d 350, 353
(7th Cir. 1972). In addition, both the Mobile Home Act and the 1974 Amendments to the Traffic
Safety Act require manufacturers who wish to contest proposed standards on the basis of economic
burden to submit cost data to the agency. See Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 6o7(a), 88 Stat. 703 (Aug. 22,
1974) (Mobile Home Act); Pub. L. No. 93- 492, § 105, 88 Stat. 1470 (Oct. 27, 1974) (Motor Ve-
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While the feasibility language of the 1970 Act could be narrowly construed to apply only to technological capacity to reduce harmful exposures,
OSHA has taken a more expansive view, asserting that the language also
entails reasonableness of costs.51 In support of its position, OSHA has
pointed to the statutory division of function between itself and NIOSH.
The latter agency develops criteria documents recommending standards
for exposure to toxic substances and harmful physical agents.52 OSHA has
responsibility for promulgation of the ultimate standard.55 According to
OSHA, this division of functions indicates a difference in the considerations appropriate to determinations by each agency: NIOSH recommends
on the basis of what would theoretically be best for the health of the worker,
and OSHA adds the "feasibility" factor. ~
The agency, of course, cannot by itself construe the legislative meaning,
and recently the judiciary has begun the task of resolving the issue. In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson 85 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reviewed the asbestos standard and held, inter
alia, that the considerations underlying the regulation "could properly
include problems of economic feasibility." 86 As a matter of statutory construction, the court found that "Congress does not appear to have intended
to protect employees by putting their employers out of business-either by
requiring protective devices unavailable under existing technology or by
making financial viability generally impossible."87
The court's delineation of the circumstances under which cost considerations may properly affect a health standard qualifies this broad proposition. The mere fact that a standard may financially burden an employer
or reduce profits would not, in the court's view, be relevant. The court
added:
8

Nor does the concept of economic feasibility necessarily guarantee the existence
of individual employers. It would appear to be consistent with the purposes of the
Act to envisage the demise of an employer who has lagged behind the rest of the
hicle Amendments). Thus, the standard-setting process created by these statutes encompasses an
approach analogous to the determination of unreasonable, and hence negligent, conduct at common
law, whereby the extent and gravity of the risk arising from a particular activity or aspect of an
activity is balanced against the cost of avoiding the risk and the utility of any conduct terminated in
order to avoid the risk. Su W. PRossER, Tm: LAw oF ToRTs 146-49 (4th ed. 1971). s~~ also Posner,
A Theory of N~gligence, I J. LEGAL STUDIES 29,32- 33 (1972). Where risk outweighs cost of avoidance
and utility, it is deemed unreasonable. Such a finding would also justify the promulgation of a safety
standard designed to put an end to unreasonable risks.
31. See J. PACE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 10, at 235·
32· s~o9 u.s.c. §§ 669(a)(2)-(3), 669(a)(7)(e) (1970).
33· &e id. § 655.
34· s~~ Statement of John H. Stender, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health, Hearings on Occupational Safety and H~alth Act Rfview Before the Subcomm. on Labor of
the Senat~ Comm. on Labor and Public Wdfare, 93d Cong., zd Sess. 228 (1974).
35· 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
36. Id. at 477·
37· Id. at 478.
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industry in protecting the health and safety of employees and is consequentially
financially unable to comply with new standards as quickly as other employers. 38

However, where enforcement of a standard might have a substantial adverse impact upon all but a few of the companies affected or might cause
the shutdown of an entire industry, OSHA "could properly consider that
89
factor." This analysis would seem to imply that the agency would have
discretionary authority to close down an industry, provided that it had duly
taken into account the economic consequences. The opinion thus is unfortunately schizophrenic, for it provides the contradictory assertions that
OSHA must not put employers out of business and that OSHA must
merely consider costs in making a decision that might put individual employers out of business.
The Fifth Circuit in dictum has suggested a somewhat different analysis. In its review of OSHA's emergency temporary standard for pesticides,
it stated that "[t )he promulgation of any standard will depend upon a
balance between the protection afforded by the requirement and the effect
upon economic and market conditions in the industry."'0 This analysis
suggests that OSHA must weigh risks against costs in every case, and thus
could cause the shutdown of entire industries in certain circumstances.
Though more coherent than the standard set forth in Industrial Union,
the Fifth Circuit's formulation provides little more concrete guidance to
OSHA.
The agency has, for its part, insisted that its responsibility in setting
health standards includes consideration of economic impact as a factor,
though not an overriding one. But exactly how OSHA fits cost into the
equation remains a mystery. In developing final regulations for worker
exposure to asbestos dust, 41 14 carcinogenic substances;2 and vinyl chloride
gas, 43 the agency had economic-impact studies prepared. However, the final
regulations provide little indication of the precise weight to be given to
costs, or even identification of these relevant costs." OSHA seems content
38. !d.
39· ld. (emphasis added).
40. Florida Peach Growers Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 130 (5th Cir. 1974).
In its attack on OSHA's vinyl chloride standard, industry argued both economic and technological
infeasibility. The Second Circuit upheld the standard. Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. Occu·
pational Safety & Health Administration, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975). The opinion addresses
technological considerations at length but avoids any separate treatment of the financial burden of
compliance.
41. For an analysis of the economic-impact statement used in the asbestos proceedings, see P.
BRODEUR 145-54, 164-71.
42. The economic-impact statement used in the development of the carcinogen standards is discussed in Page & Munsing, Occupational Health and the Federal Government: The Wages Are Still
Bitter, 38 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRos. 651,663-64 (1974).
43· Su OSHA, Vinyl Chloride: Availability of Final Economic Impact Study, 39 Fed. Reg. 33009
(19?4).
44· The preamble to the asbestos standard states merely that "the delay in the effective date of
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to cloak its use of costs with the mantle of policy judgment in order to
shield itself from judicial scrutiny!~ Yet the specific facts supporting these
judgments do not appear in the preambles to the final rules.
It is true that the weighing of the cost factor involves abundant uncertainty. Consider, for example, the difficulty in assessing the economic impact of a health standard that industry claims will terminate the manufacture of a widely used product. How are such claims to be evaluated? Of
what import is the possibility that a business might move overseas in order
to escape the costs of regulation? To what extent may OSHA call upon
industry to develop new technology that will permit affordable compliance
with a new health standard re If a toxic substance is found to be so hazardous that an entire industry would have to cease production in order to
eliminate the risk, how should OSHA measure the cost of the shutdown ?
Should not OSHA discount this cost if any part of the business may be
converted to another type of production? How should the general economic climate-in particular, problems of unemployment-at the time of
decision affect a standard ?
Further, how can such decisions be made without a quantification of
the 2-fiber standard will provide all employers a reasonable time to comply." OSHA, Standard for
Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. II318, II319 (1972). The preamble to the carcinogen stan·
dard mentions the argument that it would not be feasible to administer a regulation setting a zero
tolerance level and requiring a permit system for the use of the chemicals; however, the only specific
factor mentioned to support OSHA's decision not to adopt a permit system is: "The investigations and
evaluations of thousands of work situations involving a carcinogen, a nd the completion of the proce·
dures, possibly including hearings, for the granting of the permits, would require many years and the
diversion of substantial resources, even if available, from other serious occupational safety and health
problems." OSHA, Occupational Safety and Health Standards: Carcinogens, 39 Fed. Reg. 3756, 3758
(1974). The preamble to the vinyl chloride standard devotes several paragraphs to a discussion of
technological feasibility without specifying costs. OSHA, Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride,
39 Fed. Reg. 35890,35892 (1974).
It is instructive to compare OSHA's perfunctory discussions of costs with the detailed factual
analysis of the economic feasibility of abatement of the discharge of asbestos-like fibers into Lake
Superior, in United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. II (D. Minn.), motion for stay granted,
498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir.), application to vacate stay denied, 95 S. Ct. 287 (1974), aff'd as modified,
No. 74-1291 (8th Cir. March 14, 1975), application to vacate stay pending appeal denied, 43 U.S.L.W.
3527 (U.S. Mar. 31, 1975).
45· Section 6(b) of the Act permits OSHA to promulgate occupational safety and health stan·
dards through informal rulemaking procedures. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1970). However, upon review
by a federal court of appeals, the test is whether OSHA's determinations are "supported by substan·
tial evidence in the record considered as a whole." ld. § 655(£). In applying this test, one court has
stated: "What we are entided to at all events is a careful identification by the Secretary, when his
proposed standards are challenged, of the reasons why he chooses to follow one course rather than
another. Where that choice purports to be based on the existence of certain determinable facts, the
Secretary must, in form as well as substance, find those facts from evidence in the record. By the
same token, when the Secretary is obliged to make policy judgments where no factual certainties exist
or where facts alone do not provide the answer, he should so state and go on to identify the considera·
tions he found persuasive." Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475-76
(D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342
(2d Cir. 1973); Note, Judicial Review Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act: The Substantial Evidence Test as Applied to Informal Rulemaking, 1974 DuKE L.J. 459·
46. TheTraffic~afetyAct, 15 U.S.C..§ 1391(1) (1970),asamended, 15 U.S.C. § 1391(1) (Supp.
~II, I97_3), has been tnterpreted to authonze the ISSuance of safety standards requiring improvements
tn ex1sttng technology or the development of new technology. See Chrysler Corp. v. United States Dep't
ofTransp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972).
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the risks involved? Decades may pass before an industrial disease manifests
itself.'7 Causal relation is often uncertain and may derive from statistical
association rather than a precise understanding of etiology.48 Should OSHA
take into account who is going to bear the costs if the relevant risks do
cause harm? Inadequacies in workers' compensation coverage for occupa~
tional illnesses often force employees to shoulder much, if not all, of the
economic burden.49
An additional complication inherent in the use of the cost factor is the
degree to which industrial risks extend beyond the workplace. The spouses
and children of workers exposed to asbestos dust may develop lung cancer
and other asbestos~related lung problems by inhaling asbestos fibers caught
in the workers' clothes.50 Toxic substances endangering the work force
may also threaten the community~at~large if they escape into the surround~
ing environment.51 Where an occupational health standard carries with it
both the reduction of risks to persons other than workers and the threat
of financial debilitation of an industry, it would be a feast of unreason for
OSHA, in any balance of risks against costs, to ignore the benefits or losses
that would accrue to nonworkers. But the perimeters of the workplace
limit OSHA's jurisdiction.
None of these difficulties seems to trouble OSHA, for it has made no
real attempt to calculate the weight of the risk factor. Like mercury on
a windowpane, economic impact remains an elusive element on the list
of determinants for health standards. OSHA invokes costs with solemn
regularity but struggles to maximize the discretionary aspect in its use.
Most disturbing is the agency's having been caught playing politics with the
cost factor, thereby casting an ominous shadow over the legitimacy of its
exercise of "discretion." The final report of the Senate Select Committee to
investigate Watergate, released in mid~1974, described a June 1972 mem~
randum written by George Guenther, then Assistant Secretary of Labor
for Occupational Safety and Health, which detailed how OSHA might
assist in the effort to reelect Richard Nixon. 52 The scheme provided, in
part, that "no highly controversial standards (that is, cotton dust, etc.) . ..
be proposed by OSHA or by NIOSH." 53 The memo stressed "the great
potential of OSHA as a sales point for fund raising and general support
47· See gtnerally Mancuso, Medical Aspects of Occupational Diseaus, 19 0RJO ST. L.J. 612, 62225 (1958).
48. ld. at 615-22.
49· See grotra/ly THE REPORT OF TRE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON $TATE WoRKMEN's CoMPENSA·
TION LAWS 17-22, 35-39 (1972).
50. Ste Brody, Canctr Found in Asbestos Workers' Kin, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1974, at I, col. 5·
51. See, e.g., Htaring on Vinyl Chloride Before the Subcomm. on Environment of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. IIO, at 64- 74 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Vinyl

Chloride Hearing].
52. S. REP. No. 981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 431-33 (1974).
53· Id. at 432.
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by employers."5 ' The Committee found that no action had ever been taken
to implement the plan.55 Nonetheless, the incident does illustrate the state
of mind of the person who was in charge of OSHA and was exercising
broad discretion in weighing the cost-of-compliance factor.
Other manifestations of attitudes similarly disquieting have surfaced.
Laurence Silberman, Undersecretary of Labor and the person for whom
Guenther had written his memorandum, reacted to its disclosure by explaining that "it would have been perfectly legitimate to say that OSHA
would more nearly balance the relative interests of workers and employers
under a Republican than under a Democratic Administration."56 In addition, closely following release of the Guenther memo carne reports that
OSHA had been pressuring NIOSH to omit recommendations for specific
exposure levels in its criteria documents. 57 Since OSHA standards, with
their incorporation of the cost factor, had invariably watered down
NIOSH's recommendations, it was clear that OSHA was concerned about
its public image.58 But by keeping from public view the NIOSH recommendations, which are concerned solely with maximizing worker protection on the basis of scientific and medical data, OSHA would also be hiding
the extent to which optimum worker protection has been sacrificed in order
to reduce adverse economic impact upon industry.
The foregoing discussion points to a potential for, if not a record of,
abuse deriving both from the vagueness of the statutory definition of the
cost factor and from an expansive grant of discretionary authority that can
mask political machination. The questions left unanswered by the cryptic
language of the 1970 Act involve policy considerations that cry out for
careful scrutiny by Congress. At the very least, the law should be amended
to spell out the precise factors OSHA must take into account in balancing
the economic burden imposed by a standard against the human costs of
not setting the standard, as well as the relative weight to be given each
factor. It is crucial that congressional feet be put to the fire in delineating
the exact circumstances under which worker health is to be sacrificed for
economic reasons. Indeed, a full grasp of the implications of delegating
to OSHA authority to condemn workers to industrial disease because the
costs of avoidance are excessive might provide impetus for additional federal legislation lifting from workers the economic burdens of occupational
disability.
54· ld. at 433·
55· ld.
56. Randall, Labor Dtp't Hit on Politics in Worktr Safety, Washington Star-News, July 16,
1974, § A, at 5, col. I.
57· Ste Jackson, Agtncy Push to Dilute Job Safety Cittd, Washington Star-News, July 17, 1974,
S A, at 4, col. :2.
58. One reporter has quoted a Labor Department official as saying that the NIOSH standards
"have put us into a public relations box." Burnham, Brtnnan Defends Job Safety Aides, N.Y. Times,
July :23, 1974, at 5, col. I.
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III. FURTHER PRoPosALS FOR ACTION
Though the vinyl chloride epidemic attracted substantial publicity in
59
19'J4J other oxninous disclosures have underscored the hydra-headed nature of job health hazards. For example, the Allied and Dow Chemical
Companies reported high levels of lung and lymphatic cancer among workers handling inorganic arsenic, a chemical widely used in the production of
pesticides, ceramics, glass, and certain medicines.60 An estimated 1.5 million workers may be directly or indirectly exposed to this risk. 61 Experiments have associated liver cancer in rats with exposure to vinylidene chloride, a component of plastic wrappings for food.62 Exposure to anesthetic
gases is the suspected cause of abnormally high rates of various diseases
found in a nationwide survey of men and women who work regularly in
hospital operating rooms. 68 The cumulative impact of these findings, together with the factual material in the two books under review, point
strongly to a conclusion that little significant progress has yet been made
in stemming the health threat posed by toxic industrial chemicals.
The struggle for safe and healthful working conditions covers many
fronts and has engaged many combatants. Federal and state agencies, private industry, organized labor, and the medical and scientific communities
have all participated. And all come under attack from Brodeur and Scott
for permitting in some fashion the continuing crisis in the workplace. Both
authors take aim at doctors and scientists who place loyalty to a corporate
employer above professional responsibility for the health of employees.
Expendable Americans reflects upon and criticizes the performances of
NIOSH and OSHA in the Tyler, Texas, episode and the development of
the asbestos standard. Brodeur supplies useful, if limited, insights into
NIOSH's institutional impotence and OSHA's lack of commitment to
worker health and safety.64 Scott finds fault with both government and
labor, though her criticism is superficial and impuissant.
But Brodeur and Scott neglect two additional input sources, Congress
and the legal profession. In the years following passage of the 1970 Act,
Congress has had the task of appropriating funds for its administration
and enforcement, overseeing OSHA and NIOSH, and amending the Act
where it has proved inadequate. The legal profession possesses great poten59· See note I supra.
.
.
.
6o. See Burnham, High Levels of Cancer Are Found tn Arsemc Workers, N.Y. Ttmes, Aug. 30,
I974, at I3, col. I; Richards & Scott, Arsenic, Industry and Cancer, Washington Post, Jan. 12, I975,
§ B, at 5, col. I.
61. See Burnham, supra note 6o.
62. See Kilborn, Cancer Fear Cited for a 2d Chemical, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1974, at 39, col. 8.
63. See Cohn, Anesthetic Gases Linked to Many Ills, Washington Post, Oct. I5, I974. § A, at
r, col. I. Higher incidence rates were found for cancer, liver and kidney diseases, spontaneous abortions, and birth defects.
64. For further development of this point, see Page & Munsing, supra note 42, at 654-66.

This content downloaded on Mon, 7 Jan 2013 16:43:39 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

May 1975]

WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY

1357

tial for affecting the success of the Act. While an in-depth analysis of the
contributions of Congress and the legal profession to the cause of job health
and safety would be beyond the scope of this Review, some preliminary
observations upon certain aspects of their record are useful.
A survey of legislative activity relating to workplace hazards over the
past 3 years leaves the dominant impression that Congress has reacted much
more vigorously to industry complaints (especially those of small business)
concerning the alleged inconvenience and unreasonable expense of the
1970 Act65 than to reports of newly discovered dangers gravely threatening
worker health. As a practical matter, this response is not surprising, since
the immediate and particularized burden the Act imposes on individual
companies furnishes them with a strong incentive to pressure Congress.
On the other hand, the constituency mobilized by the risk of an insidious
disease that may afflict an indeterminate number of workers in 10 or 20
years is apt to be limited and a good deal less vocal.
As a result, prolabor elements in both the Senate and House have had
to fight a defensive battle to fend off legislation designed to meet industry
demands at the expense of worker protection. Thus in May 1974, the Senate rejected by only seven votes an amendment that would have softened
the 1970 law by making discretionary rather than mandatory the imposition of civil penalties for serious violations and by eliminating civil penalties for nonserious violations.66 In 1972, however, both the House and
Senate succeeded in tacking onto appropriations bills amendments exempting small businesses from job safety and health regulation, 67 only to be
thwarted by presidential vetoes directed at other aspects of the legislation.5 8
The political composition of the incoming 94th Congress, the state of
the economy, and the legislative priorities of organized labor are among
the factors that will determine whether the Congress in the current session
will display greater sensitivity to the safety and health needs of workers.
This Review has earlier suggested that congressional attention be directed
at the tradeoff between worker protection and costs of compliance in the
setting of health and safety standards. Two other improvements to the safeguards afforded by the 1970 Act also merit specific mention.
A controversy growing out of the vinyl chloride episode suggests the
desirability of an amendment imposing on industry a mandate to report
immediately to NIOSH and OSHA the discovery of any substantial hazard
65. See generally Hearings on Small Btuiness and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 Be/ore the Subcomm. on Environmental Problems Affecting Small Business of the House Select
Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Hearings on the Implementation of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act Be/ore the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
66. See 120 CoNe. REc . S 7294- 309 (daily ed. May 7, 1974).
67. See uS CoNe. REc. 2II02-o4, 22713-37,31307-20,33438-49 (1972).
68. See id. at 28415, 37203.
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to workers from a toxic substance or physical agent. The chemical industry
was aware in I9'JI that high concentration:s of vinyl chloride could cause
tumors in laboratory animals. 69 In late I9'J2, Italian industry-sponsored experiments revealed liver and kidney tumors in rats exposed to the chemical
at a level as low as 250 parts per million (250 ppm).70 At that time the legal
exposure standard in effect in the United States was 500 ppm.71 On July 17,
1973, a delegation from the Manufacturing Chemists Association (MCA),
the chemical industry trade association, met with NIOSH personnel to
discuss the status of research on the toxicity of vinyl chloride. The Association claims that its representatives informed NIOSH of the incidence of
tumors at exposures of 250 ppm/2 while N IOSH officials stoutly deny that
this information was ever transmitted.78 N IOSH took no action until early
1974, when the first worker fatalities were announced.H Testimony at a congressional hearing in August 1974 tends to S1Upport NIOSH's version of the
dispute.76 Another allegation of data suppression came to light in October
1974, when the Ralph Nader-funded Health Research Group charged that
until 1971 a Philadelphia company withheld from its employees and government officials knowledge of the carcinogenicity of a chemical used at
its plant, even though the company knew int njj7 that the substance might
cause lung cancer.76
Other federal safety legislation could s;erve as models for disclosure
amendments to the 1970 Act. Under the Consumer Product Safety Act,
whenever the manufacturer, distributor, or .retailer of a consumer product
has reason to believe that the product is crea1ting a substantial hazard to the
public, he must notify the Consumer Product Safety Commission.71 Congress has imposed similar reportorial requurements on the manufacturers
of motor vehicles78 and mobilehomes.79 Cleady workers have no less urgent
69. Su Kuttner, Vinyl Chlorid~ Link to Cane" Know:n in 1971, R~port Says, Washington Post,
Sept. 5, 1974, ; A, at 2, col. I. s~~ also Mintz, Ch~mical Hazard K~pt Quiet, Washington Post, May
20, 1974,; A, at 16, col. I .
70. Su Klamer, Vinyl· Chloride Riiks W~re Known by Many Be/or~ First D~aths, Wall St. J., Oct.
2, 1974, at 22, col. 3·
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.93• table G-1 (1974).
72. Su Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n, Rdease No. 38·46, Vinyl Chloride Chronology, undated,
at 9 (copy on file with author).
73· Su Vinyl Chlorid~ H~an'ng, supra note 51, at 56-57 (testimony of Dr. Marcus Key, Di·
rector of NIOSH).
74· s~e id.
75· Se~ id. at 83-93 (Sen. Tunney's questioning of Dr. Theodore Torkdson, representing the
MCA).
It is unfortunate that the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upholding
OSHA's vinyl chloride standard recites MCA's version of th•e chronology and accepts at face value its
claim to have notified NIOSH on July 7, I973· Society of th•: Plastics Ind., Inc. v. Occupational Safety
& Health Ad., 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975), af1f1lication for stay denied sub nom., Firestone Plastics
Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 43 U.S.L.W. 3527 (Marcin 31, 1975).
76. s~~ Hricko & Pertschuk, Cancer in the Workplac<:: A Report on Corporate Secrecy at the
Rohm and Haas Company, Health Research Group, Oct. 2, :1974 (copy on file with author).
77- 15 U.S.C.; 2064(b) (Supp. III, 1973).
78. 15 u.s.c. § 1402 (1970).
79· Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 615, 88 Stat. 709 (Aug. 22, 1974).
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a need than consumers for the protection that prompt government awareness of substantial risks would provide.
Congress should also give priority to devising methods of preventing
the use of new substances and processes until their safety has been established. Each year industry introduces soo to 6oo new toxic substances into
the stream of production.80 Yet these chemicals need not under present law
be tested prior to use, even though workers might inhale, ingest, or otherwise absorb them. It took an outbreak of peripheral neuropathy, a serious
nerve disorder, at an Ohio factory to precipitate research leading to the
discovery of the harmful effects of methyl n-butyl ketone, a solvent used in
the production of printing inks.81 The Senate version of the Toxic Substances Act of 1973 would have mandated safety pretesting for certain new
industrial chemicals.82 Unfortunately, the bill never emerged from a HouseSenate conference in I974· It has been revived in the current session.88
While Congress can make dramatic changes in the statutory protection
afforded workers, it remains for the legal profession to ensure the practical
application of such changes. The dictates of the dollar allocate the deployment of most legal talent. Thus, under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, those with a substantial economic stake (namely, companies cited for
violations of the Act or industries affected by proposed standards) do not
hesitate to hire top legal talent to represent them. Though the Act offers
some unique opportunities for workers to participate in its administration
and enforcement,8 • it does not provide for payment of legal fees to attorneys
representing workers in the vindication of their rights under the Act.8G
Therefore, individual employees or labor unions must pay their own lawyers. The workers' and unions' lack of immediate financial incentive and
funds for this kind of legal representation has resulted in a distinct imbalance of forces.
Admittedly, some affluent unions could devote more resources to the
legal struggles over job health and safety. On the other hand, the great
majority of American workers do not belong to trade unions 86 and do not
So. See GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SENATE CoMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PuBLIC WELFARE: SLOW PROGRESS LIKELY IN DEVELOPMENT OP STANDARDS FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND
HARMFUL PHYSICAL AGENTS FOUND IN WORKPLACES I6 (I973).
Sr. See Wall. St. J., July I5, I974, at 15, col. I. See also R. SCOTT at 9I-97·
S2. S. 426, 93d Cong., xst Sess. § 5 (I973).
S3. S. 776, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (I975).
S4. The I970 Act provides, inter alia, that employees may require NIOSH to evaluate the toxic
effects of a substance found fn a workplace, 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(6) (I970), petition OSHA for the
develop~e!lt of~ standard, td. § 655(b~(I), request OSHA compliance investigations, id. § 6~ 1(f),
and partiCipate m enforcement proceedmgs before administrative law judges and the Oceupat10nal
Safety and Health Rev~ew ~~ssion to contest the period of time granted by OSHA to employers
for the abatement of v10lat1ons, td. § 659(c). For a general discussion of employee rights under the
Act, see J. PAGE & M. o ·BRIEN, supra note xo, at IS5-S9.
S5. Attorney's fees may be awarded to consumers who sue for the private enforcement of certain
rules or orders under t~e Consumer Produer Safety Act. See I5 U.S.C. § 2073 (Supp. III, I973).
S6. It has been estimated that 2o-25% of the work force is unionized. See J. PAGE & M. O'BRmN
supra note I o, at II 5·
'
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deserve to reap the fruits of this neglect. Thus it is arguable that the legal
profession has some responsibility to help ;assure that the cause of workplace survival has adequate representation. So-<:alled "public interest lawyers"87 could redress part of the advocacy imlbalance, if ways could be found
to put public interest work on a financially viable footing. 88
The law schools harbor another source of legal talent that could be
enlisted. Students could provide legal assistance (and perhaps even representation) to workers willing to intervene: in enforcement proceedings.
They could also involve themselves in the administrative process on the
federal and state levels. OSHA has a staff of attorneys who churn out regulations setting safety and health standards and evaluate state plans submitted
for OSHA approval. A crying need exists for legally trained persons to
oversee this activity and engage in advocacy before OSHA on behalf of
workers. In addition, as the states develop plans under which they will
reassume responsibility for worker safety and health, law students in ever y
state could perform similar oversight and 2tdvocacy functions. This is an
area ripe for the creation of clinical programs at law schools in state capitals
and industrial cities around the country.

IV.

CoNCLUSION

Books such as Expendable Americans and Muscle and Blood serve a
useful, positive purpose in publicizing work]place casualties. The real need,
however, is to go beyond descriptions of what is wrong, to hammer out
specific strategies that will take into account the magnitude of the problem
and the necessity of multiple approaches, and then proceed with the daily
trench warfare of execution. It may take years before results surface, but
the issue of occupational safety and health presents a challenge to whiCh
there are no easy answers.
87. Su Note, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALJ& L.J. 1069 (1970).
88. For proposed solutions to the problem, see Sitkin tit Kline, Financing Public Interest Liti,gation, 13 ARIZ. L. REv. 823 (1971); Comment, The Private Bar, the Public Interest, and Tax In.cmtives: Monetary Motivation for Action, 13 ARIZ. L. REv. 9!53 (1971). See also Tucker, The Pnvate
Lawyer and Public Responsibility-The Profession's Armageddon, 51 NEB. L. REv. 367 (1972).
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